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CREDIT INFUSTION AS A SMALL FARMER DEVELOPMENT STRATFY ... Y 
/ 
THE IBIRUBA PILOT PROJECT IN SOUTHERN BRAZIL 
Bernard Erven and Norman Rask* 
Small farmer development programs have often followed a strategy 
of simply acting as a "broker" between credit institutions and 
borrowers. This approach stems from an assumption that institutions 
and farmers would both "profit" from getting together. The bare bones 
of the strategy is simply the demonstration of this mutually beneficial 
relationship. The present study reports on a pilot project that 
followed this strategy in bringing together private banking institutions 
and small farmers in Southern Brazil. 
Credit and Small Farmers 
In the mid-1960's, there was a relative lag in development among 
small farmers in Southern Brazil. At the same time, larger farm units 
in the same region were making significant advances in the use of tech-
nology and were absorbing most of the new credit made available to 
agriculture under special Federal programs. [Rask, 1971] Banks were 
lending relatively little to small farmers. This lack of bank credit 
was generally cited as a major limiting factor in the development of 
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small farm agriculture. Several possible explanations for tre lack of 
bank credit for small farmers have been suggested: 
(1) Small farmers could not profitably use more credit. They could 
be nearly or fully exploiting the available technology. There could be 
technology available but unused by small farmers for lack of a comple-
mentary extension input. The input and product price relationships 
could make a higher level of technology unprofitable. 
(2) Farmers might not be using all the bank credit available to 
them. They could fear lowering their equity levels because of the 
associated additional risk or for moral reasons. They might also have 
a fear of bankers brought about by language caused cotmnunication 
problems, previous negative experiences or hearsay. Terms of the 
credit could be inappropriate and unacceptable to small farmers. 
Included would be bank policies concerning loan purpose, loan amount, 
interest rate, service charges, repayment period, timing of repayments 
and security requirements. [Erven, 19691 
(3) Small farmers could be considered poor credit risks by the 
banks. This could result from failure to repay, using credit for 
consumption rather than production or investment purposes and/or using 
credit for production inputs and investments that would have been made 
with equity capital were credit not available. [ Rao, 19701 
(4) It could be unprofitable or relatively less profitable to loan 
to small farmers. This could result in there being insufficient bank 
credit to meet the needs of small farmers. [Adams, 1971] Lower interest 
rates, higher administrative costs, and higher risk relative to the 
banks' lending alternatives could explain this unprofitability. Miscon-
ceptions and lack of understanding of small farmers by bankers could 
contribute to unprofitable lending to small farmers. It could simply be 
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more profitable to limit the number of borrowers by selectin; a relative 
few large farms for a bank's agricultural borrowers. [Adams et.al., 1971 
To test some of these alternative explanations for the lack of credit 
for small farmers, improve agency cooperation and provide some bases for 
policy guidance for credit and rural development programs, the Ibirub' 
Pilot ProJect was developed. This proJect had as its basic tenant the 
provision of "unlimited" quantities of agricultural credit to small 
farmers with normal bank lending procedures, policies and terms. 'nle 
basic question was: Will an infusion of agricultural credit stimulate 
small farmers to accelerate adoption of new techniques and increase their 
productivity and income levels if the necessary new technology is 
available and the infrastructure delivery system present? The proJect 
was planned to include an extension program to provide technical 
information along with additional credit. 
Background on Area 
The small farmers for whom the Project was developed are part of 
a dual agrarian structure in Southern Brazil made up of small colonial 
farms and large extensive ranches. This structure is the product of two 
settlement patterns. The ranches of several hundred hectares are in 
the open plains areas of the southern states settled first by Portuguese 
and Spanish cattle ranchers. The small farm agriculture area located 
in the mountainous and wooded areas was settled later (1820-1920) in 
smaller plots, principally by German and Italian immigrants and their 
decendants. In the colonial areas, the pressure of rural population 
growth and division of land among heirs has gradually reduced initial 
farm sizes from approximately 30 hectares to the present average sizes 
of 10 to 20 hectares. [Rask, 19681 
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These small farms are presently operated on a part subs.stence, 
part market oriented basis. The percent of total production consumed by 
the farm family varies considerably -- from 30 to 80 percent. The farms 
are predominantly owner-operated. Less than 5 percent of the farm 
operators rent all their land, while another 10 percent rent small 
additional portions to enlarge their farm operations •. 
The labor is supplied almost exclusively by the operator and his 
family. In some cases small amounts of seasonal labor are employed to 
meet peak labor demands. On most farms the supply of labor during much 
of the year exceess that needed to perform productive farm operations. 
For example, a typical 15 hectare farm would have about two times as 
much labor available as can be productively utilized, while a five 
hectare farm would have from three to four times as much labor as 
needed. [ sa', 1965 ] 
Although the farms are small) several different livestock and crop 
enterprises are usually found on each farm. For instance, almost all 
farms have dairy cows, poultry and hogs, and raise a variety of crops 
for sale, livestock feed or family consumption. Corn is the principle 
crop and normally occupies from one-half to two-thirds of the cultivated 
area. It is used principally as feed for swine, the major livestock 
enterprise and source of income. The principle cash crops are soybeans, 
wheat, tobacco and black beans. 
Agricultural operations are performed largely by hand methods and 
animal power. Tractors and mechanical land preparation and cultivation 
are not common. Animal power and hand methods of performing farm 
operations are indicative of the low technology levels. Lime and 
fertilizer use, hybrid seed, seed innoculation, modern swine housing, 
and balanced hog rations are not corm:non in the area. Crop and livestock 
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productivity levels are low. For a sample of 105 Ibiruba fa_·ms in 1965, 
the average gross output per man equivalent of labor was $477. The 
gross output per hectare for this same sample of farms was $72. 
[ Barranda, 1970 J The farm operators' incomes on the small farms are 
not commensurate with the minimum wage established by law for wage workers. 
The municipio (county) of Ibirubl, chosen for this Pilot Project, is 
located in the small farm region of Rio Grande do Sul, the southern most 
state of Brazil. The municipio cont~ined most of the infrastructure 
necessary for the servicing of a modern technologically advanced agri-
culture. Inputs were available locally and extension and banking services 
were located in the county seat. [Erven, 1969 J 
There were two conmercial banks located in Ibirub~ which loaned to 
farmers. The agricultural lending of these two banks was primarily to 
small farmers in Ibirub,. However, they were very restrictive in loan 
amounts, purposes for which they would loan,and repayment period. They 
charged the standard 12 percent interest plus one percent service charge 
which was established by law for all Brazilian banks. However, this 
interest rate was negative in real ter:ns because of the high inflation 
rate. 
There was no Bank of Brazil a.gency in the municipio at the inception 
of the Project. To borrow from th:l.s bank, Ibiruba' farmers had to travel 
approximately 30 miles to the county seat of a neighboring municipio. 
'The Bank of Brazil had traditionally supplied a major part of the agri-
cultural credit in Brazil. Relative to the two Ibirubl banks, the Bank 
of Brazil allowed much larger loans on a per hectare basis, loaned for 
investment and livestock production purposes as well as crop production, 
and allowed much longer repayment periods. The Bank of Brazil was the 
major source of financing for the relatively few medium and large size 
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farms in IbirubA having been particularly instrumental in bringing about 
increased wheat production and mechanization through its lending 
practices. It had special lines of credit to finance farmers producing 
wheat and help them mechanize their cash crop enterprises. Few small 
farmers in Ibirub,, however, borrowed from the Bank of Brazil. 
With the restrictive policies of the two Ibiruba banks and the Bank 
of Brazil orientation to large farms, the small farmers in Ibirubi were 
not influenced much by agricultural credit prior to the Pilot Project. 
However, it was found in a 1965 study that more than 90 percent of the 
farmers interviewed felt they could advantageously use more capital. 
Moreover, a high percentage of these farmers thought they c<>uld get 
additional credit from the banks. 'nley evidently did not borrow more 
because of the restrictive loan sizes, purposes and repayment periods, 
and the inflexibility .in bank policies to reflect individual farm 
differences in capacity to use and repay credit. [Erven, 1969 ] 
Project Description and Implementation 
Early in 1966, the possibilities for some kind of agricultural 
credit pilot project were discussed by personnel from several different 
agencies. The original idea for the Pilot Project had come from 
technicians in the USAID Mission headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. 'nle 
discussions were stimulated by Brazilian and American technicians at the 
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (URGS). Two banks, the State 
Extension Agency (ASCAR), the State Secretariat of Agriculture, and the 
University were all involved in the design and implementation of the 
project. The Project was administered and coordinated by the Institute 
of Economic Research (IEPE) of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. 
All the participating agencies signed a formal project agreement with 
three objectives specified: 
(1) To rr111ke Jtva. 1 
:ilgricult'-.1-::a.l :::redit •.m.:l~r ax.:.sting bank terms to increase 
(2) To 
feel litat3 th12 ration.:::. ~se or th~ credit, .and 
(3) To measure the resuhs of :.:r.e PiJ ot Project l.r cerm::. of 
increased productivity ,,,,,; the a.pplicabiJ ity of this 
approach on a broadaT uasis [Souza, ~t.al., 1967 J. 
In addition to the er.plicitly stated objectives, there was an 
implicit interest of the participants in determining if such a compre-
hensive project was [~. ible at the local level and in determining the 
feasibility of integrating and coordinating the activities of several 
local, state, and federal agencies. 
The strategy for implementation of the Project may be suimnarized 
as involving (1) an infusion of substantial amounts of agricultural 
credit relative to what had been available from formal sources in the 
municipio, (2) orientation of extension activities and other technical 
assistance programs to complement the additional credit being made 
available, (3) initiation of an extensive soil testing program to stimulate 
interest in increased fertilizer utilization and to better orient its 
use, and (4) evaluation of the economic conseque11ces of the Project. 
The target group for this Pilot Project was the small farmers in 
the municipio of Ibirubl with inadequate sources of formal credit to 
capitalize on their development potentials. However, during the process 
of the Project, the credit was made available to any farmer in the 
municipio who applied to either of the participating banks and was able 
to meet their loan requirements. These requirements were minimal as 
nearly all farmers who applied were granted a loan. 
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The Project was initiated in Au5ust 1966 with preparatr~y activities 
including local publicity, s0il testing, and initiation of farmer 
orientation concerning the use of the additional credit. Yowever, the 
first funds we"t'f not ] caned tr.rough the l?:ro3ect until latti October 1966. 
This was ~ the optiw11"1 corn and soybean planting season had passed. 
Although the Project plan called for lending activ1t1es to begin well in 
advance of the planting season, funds were not released on schedule from 
the Central Bank to the two participating local banks. This delay in 
release of funds seriously impaired the functioning of the Project as 
the early lending activities were on a 11crash 11 basis due to the timing 
problem. The enthusiasm and support which had been generated for the 
Project were evidenced by the more than 300 farmers and local leaders 
attending the opening ceremonies. 
Each of the two local participating banks received NCr$500,000 
from the Central Bank 0£ Brazil for the Pilot Project.11 Although the 
original plan called for the banks to lend under existing Central Bank 
policies, the two banks in a separate agreement set forth several 
restrictions on their lending policies for the Pilot Project. Of the 
restrictions imposed, the most important were a loan limit of NGr$1,000, 
one year repayment period for practically all loans including those for 
investment purposes, and severe limitation of credit for livestock 
inputs. Additionally, a farmer borrowing for crop production expenses 
only received 50 percent of the principal at the time the loan was 
approved. He received another 40 percent within 45 to 60 days and the 
final 10 percent at harvest time. These various restrictions resulted 
11 In October 1966, $1.00 equaled NCr$2.20. 
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in the Pilot Project being rescricted largely to short term ~op pro-
duction loans durL"1g the first few r:,onths of its operation. Rea'Zting 
to farmer complaints and pressure fro:n other participatin6 igencies, the 
two banks gradually liberal~.zed the::.r lending practice::;, dt:!r .:.ng the life 
of the Project. 
Early in the Project, the par~icipating agencies 1na.i.·1tained 
relatively close contact with (-;ach other and the fa1:~ers in Ibirub<( 
periodic evaluations were made and some steps taken to improve the 
functioning of the Project. Howeve!', following this first wave of 
enthusiasm and dedication to the Project, intet'est waivered, and more 
importantly key personnel did not continue to place high priority on 
the Project. Also, arrangements were not made for additional funds, 
needed changes in admini.stration and strategy were not made and lack of 
needed integration of credit, technical information and technical 
assistance all contributed to the Project's termination in December 1967. 
Immediately following the termination of the Project, the Economic 
Research Institute (IEPE) conducted a farmer survey in Ibi.ruba' to 
determine the impact of the Project. 
Project Results 
The Ibiruba' Pilot Project functioned for only 15 months. This was 
insufficient time to provide definitive answers for all the questions 
raised. However, there are several important results concerning credit 
infusion as a small farmer development strategy. 
Increased Credit Use 
The Pilot Project resulted in a significant increase in the use of 
agricultural credit in Ibirubl. During the year Ereceeding the Pilot 
Project, the two participating Banks made 719 loans to farmers in Ibirub~ 
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with an average loan size of NC:r~327. During the first 70 e= ys of the 
Pilot Project, these two banks m~de 623 loans, 279 of whic~ were to 
farmers who had not bo:rl:'.'O\Jed from any bank durine; the prev: ::us three 
years. Dt•rir~ the Hrs': 6 rr.ontht. Qf the Project, 1,003 1uJ.ns were made 
and by the end of thu ffrct yea: o.l the Project 1,5<+6 loans had been 
made. These 1,546 loans avera5ec NCr$822.1/ Thus, in o<e year there 
was more tha,, a five fold ::.ncrease in the amount j oaned by the two 
banks. This was accomplished by a ~.2 increase i~ the number of loans 
and a 2.5 increase in the average loan size. 
Among the 1,546 loans, there were 943 different borrowers from the 
Pilot Project. Ninety of these also borrowed from the Bank of Brazil 
during the same period. Of the 943 borrowers, 542 had only one loan 
through the Project, 251 had 2 and 150 had 3 or more. Loan default 
was not a serious problem. 
Nearly two-thirds of the Pilot Project loans were for crop pro-
duction costs. Approximately 18 percent of the loans were for livestock 
production costs and 19 percent were for investment. The 19 percent 
for investment purposes was about the same as the percentage of loans 
for investment the year before the Project but the percentage of live-
stock production loans increased from 12 to 18 percent of the total and 
the crop production loans decreased from 68 to 62 percent. 
Comparison of Borrower and Non-borrower Groups 
In the post-Project evaluation study, the farmers of the municipio 
were divided into three groups for sampling based on their borrowing 
activities during the life of the Pilot Project. The first group 
included the farmers who had borrowed through the Pilot Project but not 
21 These and the data which follow are from [ Konzen, 1969 
Konze~'s work includes a comprehensive description and economic analysis 
of the Pilot Project. 
-11-
the Bank of Brazil. The second group included the farmers wrv had 
borrowed from the Bank of Brazil. They may also have borrcwed through 
the Pilot Project. The third group included the farmers wh(.i did not 
borrow from any of the 3 banks involved in the first two groupings. 
The borrowers from the Bank of Brazil had significantly larger farms 
and machinery investment than the other two groups (Table l). There 
was little difference in livestock herds of the three groups. The Bank 
of Brazil borrowers had a much higher investment in machinery than the 
other two groups and mere man equivalents of labor. Credit for operating 
costs and new investment was more important on a percentage basis for 
the Bank of Brazil borrowers than for the Pilot Project participants. 
Table 1. Summary Data for Pilot Project Borrowers, 
Bank of Brazil Borrowers and Non-Borrowers, Ibirubc{, 1967 
Pilot Project Bank of Brazil Non-
Item Borrowers Borrowers Borrowers 
Farm size in hectares 32.6 58.1 30 .1 
Livestock in animal units 16.6 14.6 13.4 
Machinery investment in NCr$ 3,897 13,844 2,175 
Man equivalents of labor 2.9 3.4 2.7 
Operating cost equity 56% 49% 100% 
New investment equity 81% 52% 96% 
Source: [ Konzen, 1969 ] 
Neither the participants nor non-participants had significant 
changes in land owned, operated, or cultivated during the life of the 
project, Renting of land was insignificant. 'l'he participants of the 
project had significantly different land use patterns than the non-
participants. The participants doubled their area planted to wheat while 
the non-participants did not change their area. The participants 
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increased their soybean acreage two times more than the non·Jarticipants. 
The participants decreased the size of their swine herd wh~le the non-
participants did not. The decrease in swine herd and corn ;reduction 
accompanied by an increase in wheat and soybean production demonstrates 
a tendency on the part of the Project participants to substitute cash 
crop production for swine production. These enterprise changes of the 
participants relative to the changes of the non-participants were to 
be expected given the bank emphasis on crop production credit. Although 
swine production had been a major source of income for the participants, 
improvements in this enterprise were not initially supported by the 
Pilot Project. 
The Project had as a major objective the increase of agricultural 
productivity in the municipio. This result was expected through the 
application of more and better quality off-farm inputs. However, one 
year after implementation of the Project, no significant changes in pro-
ductivity were found. The farmers that utilized credit to increase the 
level of inputs did not obtain higher yields than those that continued 
with the traditional inputs. Also, their incomes did not increase 
relative to the non-participants. However, these data are inconclusive 
for several reasons. The credit did not become available uutil late in 
the corn and soybean planting season. Consequently, lime and fertilizer 
application and planting were not timely for the credit financed crop 
enterprises. The 1966-67 crop year was abnormal due to rainfall extremes 
and insect problems. The benefits from additional investments would be 
expected to continue for several years. 
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Bank Participation 
The two banks loaning to farmers through the Project did not 
become convinced of the efficacy of providing agricultural credit to 
small farmers. A general unwillingness to enthusiastically support 
continuation of the project is one indicator. Failure to liberalize 
lending practices is another. 1hough the project was specifically 
oriented toward increasing agricultural credit and the sources of funds 
were provided from outside the private system, the banks could not be 
persuaded to liberalize their lending practices in accordance with those 
followed by the Bank of Brazil. Additionally, the Pilot Project did not 
reduce the Bank of Brazil borrowing by Ibiruba' farmers. This bank made 
200 loans to Ibirubi farmers during the first 10 months of 1967. More 
than 30 percent of these loans were for investment purposes versus 19 
for the project loans. The average loan value was NCr$6,561, approximately 
8 times higher than the Pilot Project loans. In contrast to the 
NCr$1,000 maximum loan for the Pilot Project, the Bank of Brazil had no 
maximum. The loan size was based on capacity to use credit as demonstrated 
through a partial budget worked out in cooperation with the Bank. 
The issue of agricultural credit was different for the Bank of 
Brazil as it was mandated by the Government of Brazil through earmarked 
funds to loan to farmers. However, for the banks participating in the 
Project, the relative profitability of agricultural credit was of real 
concern. It appears that small farmer loans were not sufficiently 
profitable to sustain the interest of these banks. This conclusion is 
difficult to quantify, since it in part reflects a subjective judgment of 
the desirability of assisting small farmers. However, other work 
supports the tow profitability hypothesis [Rask, et.al., 1971 ] . 
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Soil Testing Program 
'!'he soil testing program conducted as an early and preparatory 
part of the Pilot Project was very successful. Although this was the 
first soil testing campaign organized to reach a large number of farmers 
in any municipio of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, 2,450 soil samples 
were taken, analyzed, and results returned through the extension agents 
to individual farmers. '!'his resulted in a marked change in attitude 
towards soil testing, soil fertility, and the utilization of lime and 
fertilizer to improve crop yields. The fertilizer suppliers were also 
influenced as they modified their fertilizer formulations to correspond 
to the soil test results. 
Improved Inputs 
'!'he soil testing program, stepped-up extension activities and 
more intensive use of the informational system in the municipio sub-
stantially increased interest in and use of non-farm inputs. '!'he 
participants of the Project increased their use of these inputs relative 
to the non-participants. However, there were some technological 
bottlenecks. Of particular importance and concern was the inappropriate 
use of improved inputs which reflected the lack of technical assistance 
for the borrowers. 
Other Results 
'!'he informational system of the municipio was also modified and 
more intensive use made of existing means of communicating with farmers. 
A series of leaflets were published locally and distributed to farmers 
through extension agents and the participating banks to provide infor-
mation relative to crop and livestock production practices. Although 
the extension agents had regularly participated in radio programs 
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designed for small farmers, the number of such programs was ~ncreased 
and specific orientation given to utilization of the credit available. 
Perhaps the most important result of this Project for ~he agri-
cultural development of the state was the interest the Project generated 
in neighboring municipios. Shortly after the soil testing program had 
/ been completed in Ibiruba and the additional agricultural credit had 
become available, inquiries were ma.de in Ibirubi by the leadership of a 
neighboring municipio as to how they might implement a similar program. 
These original inquiries led to a second soil testing program in the 
Santa Rosa region that evolved into a very successful integrated local 
development program, Opera9ao Tatu. This new program centers on 
problems of soil improvement and increased crop production and integrates 
activities of agricultural agencies toward these conunon objectives 
[Beatty, et.al, 1971, Murdock, et. al., 1971 J. Interagency cooperation 
is being achieved. The integrated package bas come to include soil 
improvement, improved crop production practices, credit, technical 
assistance, hybrid seed, and dynamic local leadership. 
Lessons To Be Learned 
The Project clearly demonstrated that the target group would 
respond positively to new programs and were willing to quickly make 
changes in their operations. Some examples of changes are the increase 
in number of borrowers, the increase in credit per borrower, the par-
ticipation in the soil testing program, the reduction in corn production 
accompanied by increases in wheat and soybean production, increased 
non-farm input use and increased investment in fixed inputs. 
The rationing of credit for small farmers by the banks was a 
major issue orienting the conceptualization of the Pilot Project. The 
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Project plans called for an infusion of credit to eliminate this external 
rationing. The results of the pro3ect, as noted above clearly supported 
the original external rationing assumption. However, while the small 
farmers were eager to absorb additional quantities of agricultural 
credit, the private banks were not equally persuaded that this was an 
area of interest for them. The additional restrictions placed by the 
banks resulted in the farmers not being able to borrow as much as they 
wanted or for all the purposes they wanted. The credit terms from the 
two participating banks were liberalized during the ProJect but remained 
considerably more restrictive than those of the Bank of Brazil. 
Lack of agency cooperation, duplication of programs and lack of 
enthusiasm and motivation of local level technicians had been serious 
problems in Rio Grande do Sul. The Pilot Project demonstrated some 
feasible alternatives for attacking these problems. A key was the 
identification of the activities from various agencies which would 
contribute directly to the realization of Project objectives. A sense 
of being part of an accepted community program effort seemed to improve 
agency cooperation. More importantly, local bank officials, extension 
agents, community leaders and others involved at the local level had 
observable increased motivation and interest in working with farmers to 
make the Project a success. 
This failure of the Project to function more than 15 months and 
become institutionalized is of major concern. Of particular concern is 
lack of continued interest of the bank personnel. The reasons for this 
outcome appear to be largely economic. The banks must not have had 
sufficient profits from participating in the Project to induce them to 
continue. Their non-agricultural and large farmer lending activities 
probably continued to be more profitable. Initial participation by the 
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banks may be explained by pressures from local and state age;cy adminis-
trators and the banks' genuine interest in a hard look at the possibilities 
of credit infusion for small farmers coupled with a technical assistance 
program. 
There are some specific implications from the Pilot Project for 
those interested in the same approach in other areas, which have 
conditions similar to those in Ibirub~. High priority needs to be 
placed on institutionalizing the positive aspects of the program, 
recognizing bottlenecks as they develop during the project and making 
modifications necessary for the continued functioning of the project. 
Three factors appear to be fundamental, (1) There must be integration of 
credit, technical assistance, improved production technology and 
coordinated support and involvement of local and state agencies, 
(2) This integration and support is possible over a longer period of 
time only if the banks have a sufficient profit stimulus which assures 
their continued and aggressive involvement in lending to small f~rmers, 
(3) Any bottlenecks in farm production technology must be removed 
through research and farmer education. An infusion of credit for small 
farmers makes no sense in the absence of profitable opportunities which 
can be exploited through use of additional capital. These conclusions 
have been confirmed by the previously mentioned success attained through 
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